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Summary 
Using an overlapping generation model à la Blanchard (1985) with human capital 
accumulation, this article demonstrates that the influence of environment on optimal 
growth in the long-run may be explained by the detrimental effect of pollution on life 
expectancy. It also shows that, in such a case, greener preferences are growth- and 
welfare-improving even if the ability of the agents to learn is independent to pollution 
and utility is additively separable. Finally, it establishes that it is possible to implement 
a win-win environmental policy. 
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1 Introduction
Does environment aﬀect long term growth? Do environmental issues modify
the time devoted to education? Is it possible to implement a win-win envi-
ronmental policy? Over the last decade, some answers have been oﬀered to
thoses questions, at least partly. Nevertheless, their relevance remains topi-
cal, especially face to the unbridled industrialization of an economy such as
China which challenges the worldwide eﬀorts for a cleaner environment.
The purpose of this article is to re-examine the link between environment
and growth focusing on the inﬂuence of pollution on health. It argues that the
eﬀects of pollution on life expectancy may explain by themselves the inﬂuence
of environment on optimal growth, conversely to some previous theoretical
works which assumed that the inﬂuence of environment on health leads to a
direct detrimental impact of pollution on the educational activities.
In their investigations of the role of environment on long-term growth,
some theoretical papers emphasized the impact of pollution on health. In
dynamic models where the engine of growth is human capital accumulation,
some of them argued that, by aﬀecting health, pollution has a direct impact
on long-term performances because it reduces the ability to learn (Gradus
and Smulders (1993), van Ewijk and van Wijnbergen (1995), Vellinga (1999),
Vellinga and Withagen (2001)). They also demonstrated that environment
does not inﬂuence long-term accumulation of human capital if this direct
impact of pollution on education is not taken into account. Even if the
link between pollution and education sounds logical, two criticisms may be
emphasized concerning their analysis. First, they did not model explicitly
neither the inﬂuence of pollution on health (although it is the key mecha-
nism), nor the way by which worse health may alter the ability to educate.
Pollution is broadly introduced in the education sector as a simple compo-Pollution, health and growth with ﬁnite lifetimes 3
nent of the human capital depreciation (Gradus and Smulders (1993)) or as a
variable which inﬂuences the productivity of education activities (van Ewijk
and van Wijnbergen (1995)). Microfoundations would be required to clarify
the underlying mechanisms. Second, the impact of pollution on health is
well-documented (see below) and it is unmistakable that health aﬀects pos-
itively growth. 1 Nevertheless this relation appears bi-directional and while
the inﬂuence of education on health has been empirically established (see
Grossman and Kaestner (1997)), there is a lack of empirical works on the
causality between health and education (see Ding et al. (2005)). 2
Conversely, the inﬂuence of pollution on life expectancy – used as a proxy
of health –, is well-documented, especially for air pollution. For instance, Bell
and Davis (2001) and Davis (2002) demonstrate that, during the London
smog in 1952, the major part of the deaths was due to pollution and that
this event has eﬀects not only in short term but also in long-term. Several
others studies highlight that air pollution has detrimental long-term eﬀects,
even at relatively low level: Kunzli and al. (2000) calculate the net impact
of pollution tied with transport in Europe, Brunekreef and Holgate (2002)
survey works on the inﬂuence of the particulate matter, Pope and al. (2002)
ﬁnd an impact on lung cancers and cardiopulmonary mortality, Evans and
Smith (2005) show current and long-term eﬀects of particulates on heart
attacks and angina, Chay and Greenstone (2003) investigate air pollution
and infant mortality during recession. 3 Other authors study the impact
of air pollution on health for cities (Daniels and al. (2000), Dominici et al.
(2000), Dominici et al. (2002)), Peng and al. (2002), Reshetin and Kazazyan
(2004)).
So, this article aims at investigating the impact of pollution on life ex-
pectancy as the main channel of transmission of the relation between envi-Pollution, health and growth with ﬁnite lifetimes 4
ronment, health and growth, rather than assuming a direct detrimental eﬀect
of pollution on the ability to learn. In this purpose, we model explicitly the
link between pollution and public health and its impact on the lifetime of the
agents, assuming none direct impact of environment on schooling. We use
an overlapping generations model ` a la Blanchard (1985) with environmental
concerns. Long-run growth is driven by human capital accumulation ` a la
Lucas (1988) and the lifetime of agents depends on public health which is
inﬂuenced negatively by the level of pollution and positively by public health
expenditures.
Our results are threefold. First, although individual education is not af-
fected by environment we demonstrate that pollution has always a negative
impact on optimal growth. Indeed, the accumulation of human capital at
aggregate level is reduced by the loss of knowledge due to the vanishing of
the dying generation. And the frequency at which a cohort vanishes depends
on its life expectancy which is inﬂuenced by public health. When pollution
is higher in the economy, despite the increase in public sanitary health ex-
penditures, public health diminishes and the lifetime of agents as well. The
vanishing of dying generations is more frequent and so the accumulation of
human capital at aggregate level is lowered. Furthermore, the time devoted
to education in the long-run is inﬂuenced by pollution according to the value
of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of the consumption. When this
elasticity is lower than unity, a higher level of pollution increases the time
devoted to education. The social planner wants to smooth the consumption
over time and she has the desire to compensate the detrimental eﬀect of more
pollution on their utility by increasing consumption in the future. Therefore
she invests more in human capital accumulation.
Second, conversely to Vellinga (1999), we demonstrate that environmen-Pollution, health and growth with ﬁnite lifetimes 5
tal care inﬂuences positively the level of pollution and the rate of growth in
the long-run, although preferences are additively separable and the individ-
ual accumulation of human capital is not aﬀected by pollution. Furthermore,
when agents have an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of the consump-
tion lower than unity, greener preferences lead to a decrease of the time
allocated to education while growth rate increases. We also establish that
the growth-improving eﬀect of greener preferences is always associated with
a higher social welfare.
Finally, studying the decentralized equilibrium of the economy, we demon-
strate that it is possible to implement a win-win environmental policy.
The article is build as follows. Section 2 gives the basic framework of
our model. Section 3 formalizes the link between pollution, health and the
probability of death. Section 4 investigates the balanced growth path (BGP)
equilibrium of the centralized economy. Section 5 examines the impact of en-
vironmental care on the optimal growth in the long-run. Section 6 deals with
environmental policy in a decentralized equilibrium and section 7 concludes.
2 The Economy’s structure
Let’s consider a Blanchard (1985) overlapping generations model with human
capital accumulation and environmental concerns. Time is continuous. Each
individual born at time s faces a constant probability of death per unit of
time λs ≥ 0. So her life expectancy is 1/λs. When λs increases, the life span
decreases. At time s, a cohort of size λs is born. This cohort has a size equal
to λse−λs(t−s) at time t. The constant population is equal to
R t
−∞ λse−λs(t−s)ds
at time t. There are insurance companies and there is no bequest motive.
Conversely to Blanchard (1985), we assume that the probability of death
for an agent born at time s depends negatively on the public health in thePollution, health and growth with ﬁnite lifetimes 6
economy when he is born εs. To simplify we pose λs = ε−1
s .
The expected utility function in period t of an agent born at time s ≤ t














1 − 1/σ σ 6= 1,
lncs,ι − φlnPι σ = 1,
(2)
where cs,ι denotes consumption in period ι of an agent born at time s, ρ ≥ 0
is the rate of time preference, Pι is the net pollution ﬂow and φ measures
the weight in utility attached to environment, that is environmental care. σ
is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
The representative agent can increase his stock of human capital by de-
voting time to schooling, according to Lucas (1988):
˙ hs,t = B [1 − us,t]hs,t (3)
where B is the eﬃciency of schooling activities, us,t ∈ [0,1] is the part of
human capital allocated to productive activities at time t for the generation
born at s and hs,t is the stock of human capital at time t of an individual
born at time s. Note that no assumption is made about the inﬂuence of
pollution on individual human capital accumulation. 4
Due to the simple demographic structure all individual variables are ad-











−λs(t−s)ds, (4)Pollution, health and growth with ﬁnite lifetimes 7










y,t , 0 < α < 1 (5)
with Yt is the aggregate output and Kt is the aggregate stock of physical
capital.
Finally, we assume that an amount Gt of ﬁnal goods is used by the gov-
ernment to publicly provide health services Gt. This amount represents a
part θ of the aggregate ﬁnal output.
3 Ecology, health and lifetime
Following Gradus and Smulders (1993), pollution ﬂow is assumed to increase







, γ > 0 (6)
Abatement activities use ﬁnal output so the ﬁnal market clearing condi-
tion is:
(1 − θ)Yt = Ct + ˙ Kt + ξAt (7)
with ξ > 0.
Public health εs at time s is increasing with the expenditures on health
related to GDP 5 and decreasing with the net ﬂow of pollution P. So we
note εs = βθ/(δPψ
s ), where β > 0 is the productivity of the health sector,
δ is a positive parameter and ψ captures the impact of pollution on public
health“depreciation”. 6 Since the lifetime of an agent born at time s dependsPollution, health and growth with ﬁnite lifetimes 8
negatively on public health (λs = ε−1





Along the balanced growth path (BGP), the net ﬂow of pollution must be
constant because the environmental quality is constant. So public health and
therefore the probability of death are constant and equal for all individuals.
4 Optimal growth and pollution along the BGP
In this section we investigate the inﬂuence of environment on the optimal
growth in the long-run. From (7), it is straightforward that K, A, Y , C
evolve at the same endogenous rate g? than H the aggregate human capital,
in the long run.
If we assume that all individuals allocate the same eﬀort ut to schooling,
diﬀerentiating (4) with respect to time, and deﬁning ht,t the human capital of
an agent born at the current time t, we obtain the expression of the aggregate
accumulation of human capital:
˙ Ht = B [1 − ut]Ht − [λHt − λht,t]
The last term into brackets in the RHS of the equation captures the fact that
a part λ of the alive generations disappears at each date reducing growth by
λH and that a new cohort of size λ appears, adding λht,t to growth. Actually
ht,t is the human capital inherited from the dying generation. We assume
that it is a constant part of the aggregate level of human capital such that
ht,t = ηHt with η ∈ [0,1]. So aggregate human capital accumulation is given
by
˙ Ht = B [1 − ut]Ht − (1 − η)λHt (9)
where (1 − η)λHt is the loss of human capital due to the vanishing of dy-
ing generation net from the intergenerational transmission of human capital.Pollution, health and growth with ﬁnite lifetimes 9
Except when η = 1 (complete intergenerational transmission of knowledge),
this loss is always positive. So, the probability of death λ, which is also the
inverse of the lifetime of agents, contributes to long-run aggregate growth.
A higher probability of death means a higher frequency at which a cohort
vanishes so a greater net loss. It reduces the human capital accumulation for
a given eﬀort of education u.
Because the probability of death is positively determined by the ﬂow of
pollution [equation (8)], environment inﬂuences negatively accumulation of
human capital at the aggregate level although it has no impact on the ability
to learn.
As shown by Calvo and Obstfeld (1988), the aggregate planning problem
reduces to the Cass-Koopmans-Ramsey problem of optimal allocation over






s.t. ˙ Kt = (1 − θ)Kα
t [utHt]1−α − Ct − ξAt


















1 − 1/σ σ 6= 1,
lnCt − φlnP σ = 1,
(11)










, ∀ σ (12)
where P? is the value of the pollution ﬂow in the long run and Λ(·) is an
increasing function (see appendix B).Pollution, health and growth with ﬁnite lifetimes 10
The inﬂuence of pollution on u? depends on the value of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. Since Λ(P?) is positively infuenced by the BGP
level of pollution, when σ < 1 pollution increases the investment in education
(1−u?). Indeed, for low values of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
the social planner wants to smooth her utility over time. If P? is higher, she
anticipates a lower intertemporal utility, therefore she wants to increase her
consumption in the future to compensate the detrimental eﬀect of a higher
P?. She increases her investment, especially her investment in human capital.
The share of labor time devoted to production (u?) decreases. When σ > 1,
the social planner wants to compensate the current loss of utility due to more
pollution by increasing her current consumption to the expense of savings and
investment: u? increases.
Finally, the optimal rate of growth along the BGP is given by
g
? = σB − ρ − σΛ(P
?)(1 − η)
So, it is negatively inﬂuenced by the net ﬂow of pollution whatever the value
of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption.
5 Environmental care and long-run growth
Do greener preferences lead to a higher or a lower optimal growth in the long-
run? Due to the complexity of the expressions of P? (see appendix B), we
use numerical simulations to answer this question. We calibrate the model
to obtain realistic values of the growth rate of GDP and the probability of
death for the US economy. From the World Development Indicators 2004
by the World Bank, in the US economy, the death rate was 85 per 1000 in
2002 (so λ must be close to this value) and the growth rate was 3.3% during
the period 1990-2002. Furthermore the part of health expenditures in GDPPollution, health and growth with ﬁnite lifetimes 11
was 14% in 2002. So we adjust other variables to obtain such values for our
benchmark case.
Table 1 summaries the benchmark parameters value and Table 2 sum-
maries the exercise of comparative statics for log utility.
φ α ξ η δ ψ β ρ B γ
0.01 1/3 0.001 0.75 0.16 1 0.1 0.05 0.11 0.5
Table 1. Benchmark parameters values
Benchmark φ = 0.005 φ = 0.1 B = 0.15 ξ = 0.01
g 3.85% 3.84% 4.02% 8.00% 2.70%
P 0.1196 0.1206 0.1033 0.1051 0.2521
λ 0.0859 0.0863 0.0792 0.0799 0.1320
u 0.4545 0.4545 0.4545 1/3 0.4545
Y/K 0.6114 0.6072 0.6973 0.8382 1.0118
C/K 0.3668 0.3644 0.4178 0.4913 0.5184
H/K 1.0518 1.041 1.2809 2.3022 .2392
A/Y 0.1143 0.1132 0.1344 0.1081 0.1143
θ 0.2227 0.2235 0.2088 0.2103 0.3056
W 15.82 15.58 20.62 32.45 11.08
Table 2. Numerical estimations for log utility along the BGP
The third and fourth columns of table 2 highlight that, environemen-
tal care inﬂuences the long-term growth rate, conversely to Vellinga (1999)
who demonstrated that growth is not inﬂuenced by environment when pol-
lution does not aﬀect the ablity of individual to educate and preferences are
additive. When φ increases (fourth column), the weight of the net ﬂow of
pollution increases in utility. So the government decides to increase their
abatement expenditures to the detriment of physical capital. This leads to
a decrease in the net ﬂow of pollution. So public health becomes higher
and the probability of death reduces, increasing the aggregate human capital
accumulation although the time allocated to education remains unchanged.
The BGP growth rate rises, as well as the ratio H/K, Y/K, C/K.Pollution, health and growth with ﬁnite lifetimes 12
The ﬁfth column shows that an increase in the eﬀectivness of education
(B) incites the social planner to allocate more ressources to education: u?
drops. This leads to a decrease in the rate of returns to physical capital. So
production becomes less capitalistic in terms of physical capital and pollution
reduces. A lower level of pollution leads to a higher public health and so a
lower probability of death. This contributes, with the increase in B, to a
great rise of the long-term rate of growth. The sixth column emphasizes
that a deterioration in the technology of abatement (ξ the part of output
used to abatement increases) leads to higher pollution. This means a greater
probability of death and so a lower long-term rate of growth. The crowding-
out eﬀect of abatement activities is higher.
Table 2 also reports the values of the social welfare with respect to changes
in the parameters value. 7 A higher environmental care leads to a greater
social welfare due to the reduction in the net ﬂow of pollution and the increase
in the growth rate of output. In the same way, an education sector more
eﬃcient (B is higher) leads to a higher growth rate and a lower level of net
pollution and so implies a greater social welfare (ﬁfth column).
Using parameter values from Table 1, we also simulate the economy for
diﬀerent values of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ.
Benchmark φ = 0.005 φ = 0.1 B = 0.15 ξ = 0.01
g 1.44% 1.43% 1.59% 4.51% 0.387%
P 0.1470 0.1485 0.1257 0.1370 0.3219
λ 0.0966 0.0971 0.0884 0.0928 0.1527
u 0.6497 0.6494 0.6543 0.5447 0.6178
Y/K 0.5238 0.5206 0.5872 0.7073 0.7621
C/K 0.3232 0.3211 0.3619 0.42 0.3921
H/K 0.5837 0.583 0.6878 1.0921 1.0768
A/Y 0.1121 0.1112 0.1291 0.2965 0.1431
W 5.60 5.39 9.38 14.17 1.73
Table 3. Numerical estimations for σ = 0.75Pollution, health and growth with ﬁnite lifetimes 13
Benchmark φ = 0.005 φ = 0.1 B = 0.15 ξ = 0.01
g 7.32% 7.31% 7.48% 13.72% 6.62%
P 0.0645 .0649 0.0553 0.01400 0.1114
λ 0.0610 0.0613 0.0561 0.0271 0.0825
u 0.1961 0.1963 0.1928 0.0469 0.2108
Y/K 1.2111 1.1986 1.5064 17.154 3.4267
C/K 0.7075 0.7000 0.8822 10.5116 1.8297
H/K 6.7954 6.6836 9.5888 1515.93 30.03
A/Y 0.1864 0.1853 0.2071 0.2965 0.2309
W 45.022 44.53 54.79 149.01 38.74
Table 4. Numerical estimations for σ = 1.3
Whatever the value of σ our results remain valid: an increase in the
environment care leads to a lower value of pollution while the rate of growth
is higher, in the long-run. When σ < 1, a greater φ leads to a higher allocation
of human capital to production for the reasons explained before, while the
long-term rate of growth increases.
We also report the values of the social welfare. It improves with greener
preferences and a higher eﬃciency of schooling activities.
6 Market equilibrium and environmental policy
This section investigates the eﬀect of a pollution tax on the growth rate of
the decentralized equilibrium.
In this economy, there are two externalities. The ﬁrst one comes from the
detrimental eﬀect of pollution on utility. The second one arises because public
health is negatively inﬂuenced by pollution. In a decentralized economy,
ﬁnal producers do not internalize the negative impact of their pollution ﬂow
neither on utility nor on public health. So they may pollute too much with
respect to the optimal equilibrium and there is a room for environmental
policy.Pollution, health and growth with ﬁnite lifetimes 14
Let’s consider the decentralized economy. Households face the following
budget constraint:
˙ as,ι = [rι + λ]as,ι + us,ιhs,ιwι − cs,ι + Tι (13)
where as,ι is the ﬁnancial wealth in period ι, ωι represents the wage rate
per eﬀective unit of human capital us,ιhs,ι, and Tι denotes transfers from the
public sector.
The representative agents choose the time path for cs,ι and his working
time us,ι by maximizing (1) subject to (3) and (13). It gives the consumption
at time t of an agent born at time s:





t [rζ+λ]dζdι is the present value of lifetime earning
and ∆t ≡ (1 − σ)rt + σρ + λ. 8 It also gives:
˙ wt
wt
+ B − λ = rt (15)
The rate of returns on human capital (left-hand side) is equal to the rate
of returns of physical capital, the interest rate (right-hand side). When the
probability of death diminishes, the rate of returns to education increases,
because the life span of agents increases.





−λ(t−s)ds = ∆t [Kt + Ωt] (16)
with Ωt ≡
R t
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The government implements an environmental policy which consists in
taxing the net ﬂow of pollution by ﬁrms and transfering the fruit of the taxes
to households in a lump-sum fashion. 9
In the decentralized economy, ﬁrms pay a pollution tax on their net pol-
lution Pt and they choose their abatement activities At (whose cost equals
ξAt) and the amount of factors which maximize their proﬁts πt = Yt−rtKt−
wtHy,t − ϑtPt − ξAt where ϑt is the pollution tax rate. So they pay each
production factor at its marginal productivity:





wt = (1 − α) Yt
Hy,t
(19)
ξAt = ϑtγPt (20)
The pollution tax increases over time to incite ﬁrms to increase abatement
activities to limit pollution which rises with the physical capital stock.





with χ ≡ γ/ξ,








with τ ≡ ϑt/Kt is the environmental tax normalized by the physical capital,
constant along the balanced growth path. Following Oueslati (2002), we
assume that τ is ﬁxed by the government and therefore has no a transitional
dynamics. So P and λ are independant of time.
Diﬀerentiating (16) with respect to time and using the expression of
dKt/dt and dΩt/dt gives:
˙ Ct = σ [rt − ρ]Ct − L(τ)∆tKt (22)
Finally, using (15) and (19), we obtain:
˙ ut/ut = ˙ Kt/Kt − ˙ Ht/Ht − α
−1 [rt + L(τ) − B] (23)Pollution, health and growth with ﬁnite lifetimes 16
Using previous results, we can write the dynamics of the model as:
˙ x/x = [ασ − 1](bu)1−α − ρ − L(τ)[(1 − σ)α(bu)1−α + σρ + L(τ)]x−1 + x
˙ b/b = B [1 − u] − (1 − η)L(τ) − (bu)1−α + x + ξ [χτ]
1/(1+γ)
˙ u/u = α−1 [B − L(τ)] − (bu)1−α + α−1ξ [χτ]
1/(1+γ) − ˙ b/b
(24)




Along the balanced growth path, C, K, H and Y evolve at the same rate
and the allocation of human capital accross sectors are constant: ˙ x = ˙ b =






1−α − ξ [χτ]
1
1+γ = B − L(τ),
where b?
c and u?
c are respectively the BGP value of u and b in the decentralized
economy. The private returns to physical capital accumulation equals the
private returns to education.
Substracting the ﬁrst and the second equation of (24) evaluated to the
BGP gives the expression of x. Equalizing to the expression of x given by the

























σρ + σL(τ) + (1 − σ)(B + ξ [χτ]
1
1+γ)
B(σ − 1 + u
?
c) + (1 − σ − η)L(τ) − ρ + (σ − 1)ξ [χτ]
1
1+γ
In both cases, the left-hand side is a positive increasing function of u?
c and
the right-hand side is a positive decreasing function of u?
c. So there exists a
unique value for u?
c along the BGP. The LHS is an increasing function of τ
while the RHS is a decreasing function of τ when σ ≥ 1. So, for σ ≥ 1, u?
c
decreases with τ. 10Pollution, health and growth with ﬁnite lifetimes 17
Finally, the growth of the decentralized economy along the BGP is:
g?
c = B [1 − u?
c(τ)] − (1 − η)[χτ]
−γψ
1+γ .
It clearly appears that the BGP rate of growth in the decentralized economy
increases with τ when σ ≥ 1: environmental policy has a positive impact
because it reduces pollution, so it increases health and the returns education,
and therefore it fosters human capital accumulation. It means that it is
possible to implement a win-win environmental policy in our framework.
7 Concluding remarks
The purpose of this article was to investigate the link between environment
and growth focusing on the impact of pollution on health. Conversely to
some previous works, we did not assume that the eﬀect of environment on
health leads to a direct impact of pollution on education. Rather, we ar-
gued – and we demonstrated – that the detrimental inﬂuence of pollution on
life expectancy is, by itself, a channel of transmission between environment,
health and optimal growth in the long-run.
We used an overlapping generations model ` a la Blanchard (1985) assum-
ing that the probability of death depends negatively of public health and
that public health is inﬂuenced negatively by pollution and positively by
public health expenditures. We demonstrated that pollution reduces the op-
timal rate of growth while individual accumulation of human capital is not
inﬂuenced by environment. Deteriorating public health, pollution reduces
the probability of death in the economy, even if the social planner increases
health expenditures in response to the lower quality of environment. There-
fore the replacement of generations becomes more frequent and the loss of
knowledge due to this replacement grows, reducing the aggregate human
capital accumulation and the growth rate of the economy.Pollution, health and growth with ﬁnite lifetimes 18
Conversely to Vellinga (1999), we also demonstrated that greener prefer-
ences aﬀect the optimal rate of growth in the long-term, although individual
accumulation of human capital is independant of environment and preferences
are separable. Furthermore we showed that the time devoted to education
is inﬂuenced by the level of pollution when the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution of the consumption is not unity. For an elasticity lower than
one, greener preferences lead to less investment in education but to a higher
growth rate. We also established that in all cases, greener preferences are
growth- and welfare-improving, because it leads to a lower level of pollution,
that is a lower probability of death which limits the replacement of genera-
tions and therefore fosters growth. Finally, by studying the equilibrium of the
decentralized economy, we demonstrated that it is possible in our framework
to implement a win-win environmental policy.
The simplicity of our framework calls for further theoretical investigations
especially to enrich the function of public health. It also oﬀers another tools
for public authorities to curve pollution and its detrimental eﬀects on growth.
Tools which must be studied more precisely. This could give some directions
for further research.
Notes
1. See L´ opez-Casanovas et al. (2005) for theoretical analysis and policy impli-
cations. See Bloom and Canning (2005) and references herein for empirical
evidences.
2. Existing studies on the causality between health and education only ex-
aminate the eﬀect of child health on schooling performances in special cases:
structural health problems like diseases or poor nutrition in developing coun-
tries (Mayer-Foulkes (2005)), obsesity and depression in developed countries
(see references in Ding et al. (2005)).
3. See Koop and Tole (2004) for a discussion about the statistical problems
to evaluate the impact of air pollution on mortality rate.Pollution, health and growth with ﬁnite lifetimes 19
4. Furthermore, we do not assume that health positively inﬂuences the indi-
vidual productivity of schooling, even if it sounds logical. The reason is that,
as shown in the following (section 3), health depends on the level of pollution
and one of the purpose of the paper is to demonstrate that pollution aﬀects
growth even if it does not inﬂuence directly or indirectly individual human
capital accumulation. Assuming that B depends on health would be similar
to the assumption made by Gradus and Smulders (1993) and would not give
more insights.
5. We follow Aisa and Pueyo (2004) and Currais and Rivera (1999).
6. The intuition is that the temporal evolution of public health at time s is
described by:







s is the depreciation rate of public health. In the long-run, public
health is constant, so ˙ ε = 0 and we obtain ε =
βθ
δPψ.
7. Social welfare is computed using the fact that the economy begins along




























, σ 6= 1
8. See Blanchard (1985) for a demonstration.
9. We assume that the government ﬁxes exogenously θ. Assuming that it
chooses the optimal level of θ given by the equation (B.16, appendix B) does
not modify the qualitative results.
10. For σ < 1, the impact of τ on u?
c is not clear-cut. So we do not investigate
this case.
Appendix
In this appendix we derive the program (10). In a ﬁrst time, we follow Calvo
and Obstfeld (1988) who demonstrate that the aggregate planning problemPollution, health and growth with ﬁnite lifetimes 20
reduces to the Cass-Koopmans-Ramsey problem of optimal allocation over
time with single representative inﬁnitely-lived individual. After, we write
the Hamiltonian of the program and we derive the BGP equilibrium of the
centralized economy.
A The objective of the social planner
The social welfare function, at time t = 0 is the sum of two components. The
ﬁrst captures the expected utilities of agents from each of the generation to
be born, measured from the moment of birth. The second captures expected
utilities of agents from each of those generations currently alive, over the
remainder of their lifetimes, measured from the time t = 0. The planner
discount rate is equal to the pure time-preference ρ to avoid problems of
time-consistency (see Calvo and Obstfeld (1988) for more details). So welfare





















Note that the second term in the RHS is discounted by the planner at time


















Note that to keep things simple, we assumed that the centralized economy
begins at the BGP equilibrium. It enables to have λ independent to n (see
section 3).
The social planner maximizes (A.2) subjects to the constraint (6), (7),
(8) and (9) with Ct =
R ∞
0 ct−n,tλe−λndn. This problem may be decomposedPollution, health and growth with ﬁnite lifetimes 21
in two stages. First the planner solves a static problem: given a level of
aggregate consumption Ct, he allocates this level of consumption across indi-
vidual to maximize the time-t instantaneous utility ﬂow
R ∞
0 ν[ct−n,t]λe−λndn.
Second, he solves a dynamic problem, choosing the aggregate consumption
path {Ct}
∞
t=0 that maximizes (A.2) subject to (6), (7), (8) and (9).
If we deﬁne the indirect utility function:
















subject to (6), (7), (8) and (9).




at the optimum and that the necessary conditions for a static optimum are
ν
0[ct−n,t] = Πt (A.4)
for all n ∈ [0,∞) with Πt is a Lagrange multiplier. These conditions enable
to ﬁnd V [Ct] knowing ν[ct−n,t].
Let suppose that ν[ct−n,t] ≡ lnct−n,t − φlnP. From (A.3), V [Ct] =
Ω[lnCt − φlnP] with 1/ct−n,t = Ω/Ct. (A.4) means that ct−n,t = ct what-
ever n and so Ct =
R ∞
0 ct−n,tλe−λndn = ct. So Ω = Ct/ct = 1 and V [Ct] ≡
[lnCt − φlnP]. When ν[ct−n,t] ≡ 1
1 − 1/σ[ct−n,tP−φ]1−1/σ, with the same
rational, we have V [Ct] = 1
1 − 1/σ[CtP−φ]1−1/σ.Pollution, health and growth with ﬁnite lifetimes 22
B Derivation of the BGP equilibrium in the
centralized economy































The ﬁrst order conditions give:
∂H
∂C









= 0 ⇒ π1(1 − θ)(1 − α)K
α(uH)











1−1/σ − ξπ1 + π2λ
0









(1 − η)H = 0 (B.5)
∂H
∂K














K(1 − η)H = −˙ π1 + ρπ1 (B.6)
∂H
∂H
= −˙ π2+ρπ2 ⇒ π1(1−α)(1−θ)K
α(uH)





A = −γψ λ
A and λ0
K = γψ λ
K.
Using (B.3) and (B.7) gives:
˙ π2
π2
= ρ − B + λ(1 − η) (B.8)Pollution, health and growth with ﬁnite lifetimes 23









− α(1 − θ)K
α−1(uH)
1−α (B.9)
We deﬁne b ≡ H/K, x ≡ C/K, and we use P = [K/A]γ. All these
variables are constant along the BGP since H, K, A, C and Y evolves at
the same growth rate (see equation 7). So we can express the dynamics of




= (σα − 1)(1 − θ)(bu)




= B(1 − u) −
δPψ
βθ
(1 − η) − (1 − θ)(bu)
1−α + x + ξP
−1/γ (B.11)




















1−α = B −
δP?ψ
βθ
(1 − η) + ξP
?−1/γ (B.13)
that is the returns to the accumulation of physical capital equals the returns
to accumulation of human capital. Subtracting (B.10), (B.11) and (B.12)
estimated to the BGP, we obtain the value of the allocation of human capital





+ (1 − σ)
B − λ(1 − η)
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. (B.14)










+ σρ − (1 − σ)ξP
?−1/γ (B.15)Pollution, health and growth with ﬁnite lifetimes 24
Using (B.3), (B.5) and (B.14), we obtain a relation between θ? the part







βρ . So, the higher is the net ﬂow of pollution in the long-
run, the higher is the part of the public health care expenditures in GDP.























Note that θ? is always lower than unity and that limP→0 Λ(P?) = 0 and
limP?→+∞ Λ(P?) = +∞.
Finally, using the value of u? we see that the expression of the growth
rate along the BGP depends negatively on the long-run ﬂow of pollution:
g
? = σB − ρ − σΛ(P
?)(1 − η)
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